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The question of human agency as an ethical concern is applicable to the events of human 
history. Discussing this question is necessary, for if one does not consider a human being’s 
ability to function, then the result is an inevitable diminishing in human empathy and sympathy 
for the past and its inhabitants. This could then lead to a lack of empathy and sympathy for 
contemporary humankind. To demonstrate this process, one may look no further than the 
example of the Holocaust, or Shoah, of the Second World War during the National Socialist 
(NS) occupation of Germany. Ronald J. Berger’s work Agency, Structure, and Jewish Survival of 
the Holocaust: A Life History Study exemplifies this perfectly as he speaks on the issue of 
agency whilst using two different examples of Jewish agency. Berger argues that “Successful 
agency, however, was in large part a collective accomplishment and dependent on factors 
beyond individuals’ control.”1  While I do not disagree with Berger’s claim, I do believe that the 
restriction of agency is determined on a particular scale involving the individual. The only way 
for one to eliminate another being’s agency entirely is to kill them. That is why, until the 
moment of one’s death, every human being is capable of agency, which can only be limited, as 
Berger says, by “factors beyond individuals’ control.”  
The Holocaust is such an interesting case because the National Socialists were unable to 
accomplish their goal as one third of European Jews were able to avoid capture and death 
entirely whilst living in occupied territory. Thus, there is evidence that the National Socialists 
were unable to restrict the agency of the Jewish people in their entirety, as evident by Jews from 
various backgrounds, exerting what remaining agency they had left to defy the NS regime to 
 
1 Ronald J. Berger, "Agency, Structure, and Jewish Survival of the Holocaust: A Life History Study," The 
Sociological Quarterly 36, no. 1 (1995): 15-36. www.jstor.org/stable/4121275. 15. 
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their greatest capacity. Full genocide was thwarted by individual efforts which can illustrate a 
picture of collective defiance. Utilizing Berger’s definition of agency as, “the capacity to exert 
control and even to transform to some extent ‘the social relations in which one is enmeshed.’”2 
Focusing my attention to after 1939 in ghettos and camps, I will investigate period sources such 
as ghetto witness accounts, orders, and diary entries. This will allow for a comprehensive 
depiction of Jewish agency as neither entirely heroic, as Berger tries to avoid, or lachrymose, as 
painted by popular depiction.  
Defining Terms 
 To define agency without a proper connection to its relationship with resistance would be 
foolish, as many instances of Jewish agency could be interpreted as resistance against agents of 
National Socialist regime. However, Berger’s definition of agency, as stated previously, and this 
analysis of individual accounts and narratives seem unable to be classified within two major 
contemporary terms in German historiography that define different forms of resistance; 
Widerstand and Resistenz. Both were coined by scholar Martian Broszart in his Bayern in der 
NS-Zeit. Widerstand is denoted as a physical, purposive, direct, and sometimes violent, 
counteraction against the state. Resistenz describes steps that are taken quietly as to subvert the 
ruling power in a way that poses less of a risk to one’s life physically. Agency in the Holocaust, 
as expressed by Jews, cannot fit seamlessly into either one of these categories. Instead every 
action could be classified as either Widerstand or Resistenz as National Socialists inflicted 
punishment onto Jews or forced them to commit certain acts. This is the determining factor in 
why analyzing Jewish agency during the Holocaust is important, as we barely begin to scratch 
 
2 Berger, “Agency,” 18. 
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the surface of human decision-making when thousands of people are forced to commit particular 
acts so much so that one’s very survival could be determined as an act of resistance.  
 I have been using the terms “Jew(s)” and “National Socialist(s)” to distinguish between 
two groups that appear to be historically opposed in hierarchical structure. However, the 
accuracy of using such terms is problematic. Not all National Socialists condemned “Jews” to 
death or oppression; some, however, eagerly participated. Nor were National Socialists the only 
ones to force “Jews” into submission. Thus, for the rest of this essay, when speaking about those 
who were physically responsible for the oppression and deaths of determined “Jews” I will refer 
to them as non-Jewish perpetrators. Unless made explicitly clear, National Socialist(s), or NS, 
will only be used when speaking about policy carried out by the party or clearly denoted military 
affiliates. As for a universally accepted definition of “Jew”, scholars are still trying to find one. 
For the sake of simplicity and distinction for this essay, I will look to how non-Jewish 
perpetrators determined the term “Jew.” Such designations went beyond even the laws of the 
National Socialist regime. This definition says something about the level of agency Jews had as a 
collective group. They were not even allowed enough agency to distinguish themselves as either 
being “Jewish” or anything else, to deny “Jewishness.” It did not matter if one was Orthodox or 
Secular, Reformed, Conservative or Convert. If the perpetrators determined one to be a Jew, then 
they were targeted. 
National Socialist Policy 
The diminishment of agency would not have been possible without the implementation of 
NS policies which contextualize agency restriction throughout the Holocaust. Reinhard Heydrich 
was the Director of the Reich Main Security Office from 1939 to 1942. He and Heinrich 
Himmler arguably the leading architects behind the Holocaust, as supported by many obtainable 
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documents. One of which was his “Policy and Operations Concerning Jews in the Occupied 
Territories.” In this document Heydrich outlined his plans for Jewish internment in concentrated 
cities (ghettos) and the establishment of “Councils of Jewish Elders.”3 This section states that 
“The Council is to be made fully responsible, in the literal sense of the word,  for the exact and 
prompt implementation of directives already issued or to be issued in the future.”4 This order 
could have easily been taken as a preventive measure to ensure that the oppression of Jews 
would continue within ghetto communities. However, this would later allow NS officials to 
further order the council to, unknowingly, evacuate groups of Jews to death and work camps 
where they would either be killed immediately or worked until death. This order does not 
mention evacuation or the systematic killing specifically. However, the entirety of Wannsee 
Protocol written in 1942 speaks upon the operations to evacuate Jews. It states that, 
Another possible solution of the problem has now taken place of emigration, i.e. the evacuation of the Jews 
to the East… Approximately 11 million Jews will be involved in the final solution of the European Jewish 
question…The begging of the individual larger evacuation actions will largely depend on military 
developments.5 
These orders where given in succession in 1939 and 1942 respectively and they demonstrate the 
progression, restriction, and oppression by non-Jewish perpetrators. This oppression of course 
would not cease, as evident by the Auschwitz Protocols by Alfred Wetzler and Rudolf Vrba 
which state explicitly that the total number of Jews killed between April 1942 and April 1944 at 
Auschwitz, was approximately 1,765,000.6 This is the world in which Jews had to fight to 
survive, and in doing so were forced by perpetrators to commit desperate acts. Some of these acts 
 
3 Reinhard Heydrich, “Policy and Operations Concerning Jews in the Occupied Territories,” The Third Reich 
Sourcebook, ed. Anson Rabinbach (Berkley: University of California Press, 2013) 749-750. 
4  Heydrich, “Policy,” 750. 
5  “Wannsee Protocol,” The Third Reich Sourcebook, ed. Anson Rabinbach (Berkley: University of California Press, 
2013) 753-755. 
6 Alfred Wetzler and Rudolf Vrba, “Auschwitz Protocols,” The Third Reich Sourcebook, ed. Anson Rabinbach 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 2013) 802. 
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might be characterized as heinous under normal circumstances. However, the circumstances 
were anything but normal for Jews during German occupation. The questionable ethics that were 
applied during this period leads into serious inquiries regarding personal agency. 
Constraining Situations 
One must consider the roles and opportunities that Jews had inside and outside of the 
ghettos to help determine the degree of agency that individuals held. It should be noted that, one 
individual does not represent the agency of the entire European Jewish population. Yet, it is 
looking at individual cases that one will come closer to understanding the unique positions of 
Jews working within the confines of persecution. One such individual was Dr. Israel 
Milejkowski who had conducted a remarkable study of hunger in the Warsaw Ghetto. In his 
“Evaluating the Ghetto” Milejkowski described the limitations of the ghetto while at the same 
time acknowledging the important role of survival in the ghetto. 
The chief curse of the ghetto is that there we can not be creative. Under brutal outside pressure we have lost 
the possibility and also the qualities of creativity… one thing is terribly clear: the ghetto demoralizes! What 
is a blessing for the ghetto-smuggling, for example- is from the national standpoint a curse.7 
Milejkowski went on to suggest that the generation to come out of these smugglers would be 
considered deplorable, and he gave no information on whether they were able to move out of the 
ghetto by covert means. His idea of future generations, however, does not impact the choices and 
free agency that these smugglers have in comparison to other residents of the ghetto. They were 
able to provide luxuries that would have previously been taken for granted before the occupation.  
Even Dr. Milejkowski himself would go on to provide for the ghetto in a way that non-Jewish 
perpetrators were unable to control. However, Milejkowski arguably had more agency than 
 
7 Hillel Zeitlin and Israel Milejkowski, “Evaluating the Ghetto,” The Third Reich Sourcebook, ed. Anson Rabinbach 
(Berkley: University of California Press, 2013) 762-763. 
Knapik 6 
 
others, such as Zalmen Gradowski, who were forced to escort other Jews to the gas chambers. 
Gradowski had witnessed extraordinary amounts of death as he was assigned this task by NS 
officers. His particular case shows how Jewish agency diminished throughout the Holocaust 
from the ghettos to the gas chambers. In his testimony he speaks solemnly about the final words 
of a group of female victims. 
Others spoke to us quietly and calmly: “We’re still young. We want to live, just a little more life.” They 
weren’t pleading with us, for they knew that we were victims just like themselves. They simply spoke, 
spoke just like that, because their hearts were heavy and before they died they wanted to tell their sorrow to 
those who would survive them.8 
Gradowski counts himself among the victims. Obviously, he would not be among those he had 
just escorted to be killed, but he assumed that these women are speaking not out of a plea, but for 
the sake of venting their sorrow to those who would understand. Transporters like Gradowski 
were among those persecuted and whose agency had significantly been diminished. With what 
little agency he had left, he could not have improved the situation of those he had led to the 
camps, as his capability as an individual would not have been enough. This does not mean that 
he was completely unable to do anything, for there are many cases, even within Gradowski’s 
testimony, that suggest differently, which will be spoken about later. The capabilities of those 
that Milejkowski and Gradowski describe are largely different. Yet, they both bring up questions 
of how Jews responded to their new environment and forced submission by the non-Jewish 
perpetrators.  
Demonstrations of Limited Agency 
Ethical concerns must be raised regarding forced participation of Jews in the destruction 
and systematic oppression of their loved ones and compatriots. Stefan Ernest raises such 
 
8 Zalmen Gradowski, “The Czech Transport,” The Third Reich Sourcebook, ed. Anson Rabinbach (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 2013) 807. 
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concerns as he debates the actions of Adam Czerniaków, president of the Warsaw Ghetto 
Council, after he had committed suicide as an act of protest against non-Jewish perpetrators. 
Ernest condemns the action of the president stating that “[He] committed a major error, possibly 
even an act of cowardice…[He] should have lived and led the rebellion…For the sake of honor 
he should have let them assume responsibility for shedding their own blood.”9 Was 
Czerniaków’s suicide an act of a final choice, or was it a restriction of others’ agency, as Ernest 
suggests? Did he effectively slow the killing of more Jews as a sacrifice, or did he give into the 
goal of non-Jewish perpetrators?  This case, due its ethical conundrum, is what I argue to be one 
of the closest possible cases of complete erasure of one’s agency, second only to death. 
Although, there are similar cases in which another in the same position did not commit suicide. 
One might argue that those who were led into the gas chambers at death camps would have had a 
similar, if not worse, restriction of agency. A counter to this is that the victims held some sense 
of agency once they realized the inevitability of their own death. Once again in Gradowski’s 
accounts he tells of disrobed women who try to persuade the officers into touching them before 
they were killed. Gradkowski specifically mentions the stories of two women in his journal. One 
of which, after a rebuking speech toward the officers, spat in the face of a female SS officer 
before going into the crematoria.10 Another women also rebuked the officers, only this time, 
attacked the director of the crematoria which resulted with her being clubbed, after which she 
calmly and willfully went to her death. In both instances neither women had to deal with the 
ethical conundrum of dealing with the lives of others. They only had themselves and still had the 
choice to take, what was deemed as, impactful action against their oppressors. As Gradowski 
 
9 Stefan Ernest, “Warsaw Ghetto Diary,” The Third Reich Sourcebook, ed. Anson Rabinbach (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 2013) 765. 
10 Gradowski, “Czech Transport,” 809-810. 
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states, “The officers stood silent, stunned…They had let her speak even though they knew what 
she would say, compelled to listen to this Jewish woman on her way to die.” We cannot know 
with certainty if Gradowski’s account is accurate, but even if this particularly detailed case did 
not happen, there is still a likelihood that something similar to it did. He too was a Jew and 
would have likely felt responsibility to some degree. The next question to ask would be what 
restrictions had Gradowski encountered that would have determined his level of agency. 
Unfortunately, Gradowski does not speak about himself enough to speak about his level of 
agency.  
One must consider the gendered aspect of Gradowski’s testimony as well. He speaks on 
behalf of a group of women who could not speak for themselves. One cannot expect to receive 
testimony from any of the victims unless they survived due to extraordinary circumstances. 
Otherwise the evidence presented is already skewed in favor of a male perspective. Visiting the 
role that gender has played within accounts of Jewish oppression, one can find a great example 
in the testimony of Stefania Staszewska. Staszewska had been transferred from the Warsaw 
Ghetto and recounts witnessing its fiery destruction due to conflict involving agents of the NS 
regimen and armed resistance. Due to unfortunate circumstances Staszewska and others are 
accused of escaping and are escorted to be, to her knowledge, executed. In the meantime, a 
young boy from her group tries to run away, 
One boy tries to escape and takes a series of bullets in the stomach. He runs a few more meters, curling up 
like a cat. He’s writhing with pain; the Germans order us to carry him by his arms and legs to the 
Befehsstelle…The wounded boy is howling with pain; his brother asks the Germans to put him out of his 
misery but they just laugh. “You’ll all look like that in a minute.”11 
 
11 Stefania Staszewska “Warsaw Ghetto Diary,” The Third Reich Sourcebook, ed. Anson Rabinbach (Berkley: 
University of California Press, 2013) 779. 
Knapik 9 
 
Once again, we have an example of a person speaking about an instance that happen to someone 
else of the opposite sex. A significant difference between Staszewska and Gradkowski is that in 
Staszewska’s case, the NS officer that was spoken to responded with joking cruelty. She also 
separates herself, as a Jew, from the soldiers, as denoted by her use of “Germans.” This is 
important as she later refers to specific onlookers as “Poles” separating herself from both her 
oppressors and bystanders. The deduction can be made that she is a Jew, but more importantly 
one who makes the distinction between the three. This account seems to contradict efforts made 
by Jews before the NS occupation to unify Jewish and German identities for themselves and to 
fight against prevailing Anti-Semitic attitudes. Staszewska has added yet another layer of 
complexity to this debate. The ethical component to specific narratives of Jewish agency 
underscores an entire subfield regarding Jewish resistance.  
Ethical Conundrums & Religious Denunciation 
In his article “Jewish Resistance” Robert Rozzet gives a historiographical overview of 
scholarship regarding Jewish resistance to National Socialists and non-Jewish perpetrators alike.  
Rozzet states that, 
Many early writers considered armed resistance to the Nazis to be the only legitimate response for Jews, 
who had shed their Diaspora-like behavior. Those who did not resist with arms (or at least flee in the face 
of the Nazi onslaught) were denigrated, and they were bunched together under the rubric of having gone to 
their deaths ‘like sheep to the slaughter’. This became a common view in Israel of the behavior of Jews 
during the Holocaust.12 
This historical line of inquiry since its inception seems to disregard any accounts that would 
advocate for the “passive” nature of interned Jews. Granted, rebellion and rescue are serious 
 
12 Robert Rozzet, “Jewish Resistance,” In The Historiography of the Holocaust, edited Dan Stone (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 341-342. 
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topics of consideration when looking at agency. However, collective agency utilizing an act of 
rebellion or rescue could not have been accomplished without outside help, pre-planning, or 
spontaneous group insurrection. When one breaks events down to an individual level judgment 
becomes comprised as situations become grayer. Take the earlier example of Adam Czerniaków 
in the Warsaw Ghetto. He believed his unfortunate action would be suicide. On a strictly 
individual level one could argue that his suicide was a final act of agency that would release him 
from oppressive control by his superiors. However, the strikingly harsh result of his death was a 
contribution to the end goal of the NS regime and non-Jewish perpetrators. To them he was 
likely just one more dead Jew. What complicates matters further is that Czerniaków had to 
consider the lives of other Jews within the ghetto. Perhaps his suicide was to serve a larger 
purpose of slowing down forced relocation of Jews to concentration and death camps. If this was 
the case, then his agency was still restricted up until he died, for he made a choice out of a 
pressured circumstance. Not only that but whether he did something or nothing, he would have 
restricted the agency of fellow Jews. This is arguably a worse situation than those heading into a 
gas chamber of their own fruition without having to choose whether others live or die. Pressured 
suicide resulting from a forced ethical choice is not a justified final act of agency. To quote 
womanist theologian Eboni Marshall Truman, “If one’s whole life is already on a trajectory of 
death, how redemptive is the use of death for political activism?”13 Czerniaków would not have 




13 Michelle Wolff, “Madonna and Child of Soweto: Black Life Beyond Apartheid and Democracy,” Political 




The argument that the National Socialist’s goal of complete genocide was in part 
thwarted by individual efforts illustrating collective defiance is entirely supported by the fact that 
no human being can be limited to having absolutely no choice. To inquire about individual cases 
is to also create an ethical basis for analyzing collective action in examples of rebellion, rescue 
operation, or escape attempts, as Rozzet’s article points to. This claim obviously delves into the 
realm of philosophy, but it is a question that must be addressed to help adequately describe the 
experiences of historical figures and oppressed groups. It raises questions like whether suicide is 
a valid final expression of agency under given circumstances. When asking about historical 
inquiry we must begin to look to the voices of those who lives where complicated by an 
oppressive force. Doing so helps gauge action that was taken, so that in future situations actions 
like it could either be followed or avoided. Exemplifying Jewish agency speaks to the principles 
of inclusive scholarship. By viewing and investigating these narratives we limit the risk of 
overwhelming apathy to history as well as to the contemporary era. 
  
